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JEFF KOMINSKY*
For years, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC'), without exception, has permitted companies to
exclude shareholder proposals to adopt proxy access
policies. However, a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees v. American
International Group, Inc. ("AFSCME v. AIG"), has
opened the door for shareholder access to proxy
materials and represents a significant leap forward for
shareholders seeking to elect directors more responsive to
their concerns. This note will explain proxy access rights,
specifically with regard to shareholder proposals covering
the election of a board of directors, and conclude by
describing how this recent Second Circuit case has incited
a renewed consideration by the SEC to modify its position
on shareholder elections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholder access to company proxy materials has profound
implications in the United States.' For years, shareholders have attempted
to install policies which would allow fellow shareholders to consider and
vote on proposals through corporate proxy materials.2 Despite these efforts,
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), without exception, has
permitted companies to exclude shareholder proposals to adopt proxy
access policies.
However, a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v.
American International Group, Inc. ("AFSCME v. AIG"), has opened the
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door for shareholder access to proxy materials and represents a
significant leap forward for shareholders seeking to elect directors more
responsive to their concerns. The court ruled that a shareholder
proposal does not relate to an election (under SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(8))
if it simply seeks to amend the corporate by-laws to establish general,
procedural rules governing elections.4 In turn, the court implied that the
SEC must reevaluate Rule 14a-8(i)(8).
This note will explain proxy access rights, specifically with regard
to shareholder proposals covering the election of a board of directors, and
conclude by describing how this recent Second Circuit case has incited a
renewed consideration by the SEC to modify its position on shareholder
elections.
II. PROXY ACCESS
The board of directors of a corporation does not have total control
of the election of a successor board . Instead, shareholders have an
exclusive right to elect the board as well as the right to nominate candidates
for directorships.6 If a shareholder is not able to directly apply his or her
rights, he or she can apply them via a "proxy."
The term "proxy" refers to a written authorization of voting power
by a shareholder. 7 A proxy is typically given because a shareholder may be
unwilling or unable to attend the annual shareholder meeting.8 Nowadays,
this is quite common. Shareholder attendance is usually low because
4"ownership of most publicly held corporations is widely dispersed." 9 Thus,
proxies, under certain requirements,10 must be solicited in order to satisfy a
quorum requirement.'' After soliciting proxies, "management mails to each
shareholder a proxy form, along with a proxy statement and annual
report. ,12 A proxy form authorizes a specific "proxy holder" to represent
the shareholder and vote the shares at the annual shareholder meeting.,3 A
4 AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2006).
5 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (Supp. 2002) (although it is often empowered to fill
interim vacancies caused by death, resignation, or removal).
6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (Supp. 2000), cited in Poirier v. Welch, 233 F. Supp.
436, 439 (D.D.C. 1964).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (1992).
8Id.
9 Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in the
Use of Proxy Voting to Influence Corporate Governance, 7 LAB. LAW. 771, 791 (1991).
'o See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1) (1998).
11 Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND.
L. REv. 1129, 1135 (1993).
12 Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk: The Changing
Face of Corporate Governance, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 43, 98 (1998).
13 Zanglein, supra note 9, at 791 n.190. Rule 14a-4 describes the requirements for a
proxy form. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2007). A proxy form must:
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"proxy statement" is a detailed communication which discloses all material
information about the organization 4 in such a manner that can be easily
understood by shareholders.1 5
When corporate proxy materials are submitted, the process is
referred to as "improving shareholder access to the proxy."' 6 Specifically, a
shareholder may direct the proxy holder to vote in a certain manner.17
However, it is more typical for the shareholder to grant the proxy holder the
authority to vote according to the proxy holder's preference, which must be
clearly indicated on the proxy form.' 8 When there is a failure by the
shareholder to indicate a preference, a proxy may vote at the proxy holder's
discretion. 9
Regardless of how a proxy is voted, the main issue of concern is the
specific information presented in proxy statements. Specifically, a
shareholder has some rights to present information on a company's proxy
materials. These shareholders' rights are governed by Rule 14a-8.
(1) identify in boldface type the person or group which is soliciting
the proxy. Rule 14a-4(a)(1).
(2) provide a "specifically designated blank space for dating the
proxy card." Rule 14a-4(a)(2).
(3) clearly and impartially identify the matters to be voted upon.
Rule 14a-4(a)(3).
(4) provide the shareholder with the opportunity to choose between
approval, disapproval or abstention with respect to all matters to be
voted upon other than the election of directors. Rule 14a-4(b)(1).
(5) set forth the names of each person nominated as a director and
provide the shareholder with a means by which to withhold authority
to vote for a particular nominee. If a means is provided for the
shareholder to grant authority to vote for the nominees as a group,
then a means must also be provided for the shareholder to withhold
authority to vote for the entire group. Rule 14a-4(b)(2).
(6) provide that the shares represented by the proxy will be voted,
and if the shareholder properly has indicated his or her choice of
approval, disapproval, or abstention, the proxy will be voted in
accordance with the shareholder's instructions.
Rule 14a-4(e).
14 Rule 14a-4(c)(1) requires the proxy form to contain a statement such as the following:
So far as is known by [management], no matters other than the election of
directors [and other matters listed on the proxy form, if any] will be
considered at the [annual] meeting. However, if any other matters properly
come before the meeting, the Proxies names in the accompanying proxy
intend to vote said proxy in accordance with their best judgment.
Zanglein, supra note 9, at 809 n.192 (cited in SEC Release Nos. 33-66-76, 34-
23789 (Nov 20, 1986)).
15 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2007).
16 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2007) (cited in Fisch, supra note 11, at 1135 (referring to a
proxy voting mechanism)).
17 Zanglein, supra note 12, at 98.
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(1) (2007).
19 ,,
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III. ESTABLISHMENT OF RULE 14a-8
In 1934, Congress authorized the SEC to regulate proxies through
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 20  Subsequently, the SEC
promulgated proxy rules. 21  One of these rules was Rule 14a-8, which
grants an opportunity for a shareholder "to have his or her proposal placed
alongside management's proposals in that company's proxy materials and
be put to a vote at an annual or special meeting of shareholders. 22 Thus,
Rule 14a-8 has become increasingly popular because it provides a nexus
between shareholders and companies, as well as among shareholders
themselves.23
Though 14a-8 gives shareholders access to the corporate proxy
materials in order to submit proposals on certain matters,24 access is
restricted in important ways (even after proper submission). One way is via
a management claim that certain proxy rules are not applicable to all
25corporations which solicit proxies.
Another substantial way to restrict shareholder proposals, one more
thoroughly discussed in this note, is that management may exclude a
26proposal without violating Rule 14a-8. For example, even though the
proposal might be a proper subject for shareholder action under state law,
the corporation is still allowed to exclude the proposal if it "deals with a
matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations ' '27 or "if the
proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be
20 Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1934).
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or any facility of a
national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,
to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12 of this title.
Id.
21 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2007).
22 Division of Corporation Finance: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (Jul. 13, 2001),
available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslbl4.htm.
23 id.
24 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007).
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (2007); see also Carter v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 362 P.2d
766, 769 (Or. 1961) ("We know that it could be invoked for harassing purposes that
could only be avoided by extensive litigation. We must be aware that to judicially
impose the suggested rules in these circumstances might well impair rather than benefit
the orderly development of this important area of the law of corporations.").
26 Myron P. Curzan and Mark L. Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy: Control of
Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L. REV.
670, 673 (1980).
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2007).
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submitted to shareholders at the same meeting. ''28  However, the most
recent tension between management and shareholders is over the
exclusionary power of a proposal that "relates to an election.,
29
IV. 14a-8 (i)(8): THE "TOWN MEETING RULE"
Of all the restrictions imposed by management on proxy proposals,
the one that has received recent attention deals with a proposal that "relates
to an election.,, 30 In 1942, an unfavorable public response to a Rule 14a-8
proposal (which would have allowed management to include these
proposals 31) led to the SEC interpretation that Rule 14a-8 should not permit
shareholder proposals in support of challengers.32 Subsequently, the SEC
amended the text of the Rule to explicitly exclude proposals relating to
director elections.33
Under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), a corporate board may exclude a proposal
"if the proposal relates to an election for membership on the company's
board of directors or analogous governing body. '34  In other words,
shareholders are given an opportunity to only vote on those candidates
nominated by the company. 35 This restriction, along with the others in 14a-
8, was developed by Congress in order to prevent abuses perpetrated by
shareholders.3 6 These abuses were directed not merely in connection with
securities transactions, but also with the misuse of proxy machinery.37
The basic application of the provision is that it prevents a
shareholder from using Rule 14a-8 to nominate or advocate the election of a
particular director.38 It is crucial to note that the SEC has not interpreted
28 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(9) (2007).29 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8)(2007).
30 id.
31 See Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R.
1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th
Cong. 17-19 (1943) (testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell).
32 Id.; see also James McRitchie, Re: S7-10-03 Possible Changes to Proxy Rules (May
26, 2003), available at http://www.corpgov.net/forums/commentary/S7-10-03.html.
33 Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 183 n.60 (1988).
34 See id.
35 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,626,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,786 (proposed
Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
36 Report on Stock Exchange Practices, S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934),
as reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 77 (cited in note 235)[hereinafter the "Fletcher
Report"].
3 Id.8[
38 See, e.g.,, SCI Systems, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 875
(Aug. 14, 1992) (permitting exclusion of a proposal nominating director candidates);
CMT Investment Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3382 (Mar.
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Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to bar general proposals relating to election procedures,
such as cumulative voting rights and general qualifications for directors. 9
However, the SEC has allowed management to exclude any proposal that
40
could be viewed as merely interfering with election of existing directors.
The SEC staff has explained that even proposals relating to general
director qualifications may be excluded if they relate to or would interfere
with the election of current nominees. 4 1 However, this does not mean that a
proposal, for example, to institute cumulative voting may be omitted under
this rationale.42 Instead, it means that a proposal to elect or not to elect
persons who do not own stock in the registrant (if persons who do not own
stock have been nominated) may be omitted.43  For example, the SEC
approved the exclusion of a shareholder proposal submitted to Mobil which
sought to amend Mobil's by-laws by preventing citizens of OPEC countries
from serving on the board of directors.44 Mobil argued that the proposal
would have the effect of barring a sitting director, who was an OPEC
citizen, from re-election.4 5 The SEC staff agreed that the proposal could be
excluded under Rule 14a-8(c)(8) because it related to an election.4 6 Mobil's
exclusion of the proposal was upheld by the court.47
27, 1981) (applying Rule 14a-8(c)(8) to nominations for election to the board of
directors).
'9 See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange
Act Release No. 12,999, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, *34-35 (Nov. 22, 1976) (explaining the
scope of the exclusion).
40 See, e.g., Tylan Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2530 (Sept.
25, 1987) (allowing exclusion of a proposal that would increase representation, on the
director's slate, of certain groups, including minorities. A letter dated June 23, 1987
from Sidney L. Groves requesting that Tylan include in its 1987 Proxy Statement a
proposal (the "Groves Proposal") to:
(a) reduce the number of directors; and
(b) nominate a new slate of directors to represent the interests of (i) outside and
minority employee stockholders, (ii) Tylan employees, and (iii) bank lenders).
41 See, e.g., Chicago Milwaukee Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 961 (Sept. 23, 1992).
42 Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Proxy statements and proxies under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 591 PLI/Corp 355, 417 (1988).
43 See Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1959).
44 See Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d 205, 206-07 (6th Cir. 1984) (describing the
SEC review of and response to the shareholder proposal).
45 Id at 206.
46 Id. at 207 (SEC staff advised Mobil that the "proposal and supporting statement call
into question the qualifications of Mr. Olayan for reelection and thus the proposal may
be deemed an effort to oppose management's solicitation on behalf of the reelection of
this person.").
47 id.
PROXIES AND THE SEC
V. THE EVOLUTION OF 14a-8(i)(8)
In the early 1940s, the SEC took a few tentative steps toward
providing access to shareholders.48 While the SEC began to address ballot
access for shareholder proposals, it also considered whether shareholders
should have direct access to the corporate ballot in connection with director
elections. In 1942, the SEC proposed a rule that would have required
corporations to include shareholder-nominated director candidates in the
corporation's proxy statement.49 Corporate management criticized the
proposed rule on the grounds that it was unworkable; shareholders might
nominate unqualified candidates or create ballot confusion by nominating
too many candidates.5 °  The fear was that interference with effective
corporate management could prove costly in connection with the wartime
5 52effort.5 1 The SEC abandoned its efforts to pass the rule. Consequently,
the unfavorable response in 1942 lead to a 1947 amendment, which
interpreted the Division of Corporate Finance's policy to "exclude
proposals that related to the election of the directors so that proponents
could not use the shareholder proposal process to effectuate a proxy
contest.,
53
In 1976, the SEC codified the 1947 amendment when it created the
Rule 14a-8 (i)(8) exclusion.54 The final rule deleted the words "corporate,
political or other" from the election exclusion.5  The Commission
explained that it "intended to expand the scope of the existing exclusion to
cover proposals dealing with matters previously held not excludable by the
4' Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 1942 SEC LEXIS 44 (Dec. 18, 1942); see also
Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821,
and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong.
17-19 (1943) (testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell).
49 Exchange Act Release No 3347, supra note 48.
50 Fisch, supra note 11, at 1163 (citing J.A.C. Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes:
Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183,
214 (1979)).
51 id.
52 See Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules, Hearings on H. R. 1493, H. R.
1821, and H.R. 2019 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 78th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1943). Although commentators have continually
called for a rule permitting shareholders direct access to the ballot to nominate
candidates for the board of directors, the SEC has never re-proposed such a rule. See,
e.g., Robert N. Shwartz, A Proposal for the Designation of Shareholder Nominees for
Director in the Corporate Proxy Statement, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (1974); Mortimer
M. Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate
Suffrage, 39 VA. L. REV. 141 (1953).
53 Fisch, supra note 11, at 1163-64.
54 Exchange Act Release No. 12,598, 9 SEC Dock. 1030, 1034-35 (1976) (proposing
release); Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 10 SEC Dock. 1006, 1013 (1976) (adopting
release).
51 See AFSCME v. AIG, 2005 WL 562207 (Feb. 25, 2005).
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Commission, such as cumulative voting rights, general qualifications for
directors, and political contributions by the issuer., 56  The SEC's
interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) allowed a corporation to exclude a
proposal if "[t]he proposal relates to an election for membership on the
company's board of directors or analogous governing body. 57  In other
words, the SEC interpreted the proposal as addressing the nomination of
committees, not necessarily shareholder access to company proxies 58
In 1989, the California Public Employee's Retirement System
("CalPERS"), the largest publicly funded retirement system in the
country,59 submitted proposals for comprehensive revisions to the SEC's
proxy rules adopted under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. The 48
proposals submitted were divided into four categories: (1) structure and
procedure; (2) shareholder communications; (3) enhancement of disclosure;
and (4) SEC filing and review of proxy materials. 60 The intent of the
proposals was to illuminate the substantial imbalance between shareholders
61
and management concerning the filing and processing of proxy materials.
CalPERS suggested that proposals relating to an election to office would
only be permitted to be excluded "if the proposal related to the election of a
specifically named individual to a specific office or to an election to office
being considered at the meeting for which proxies are being solicited. 62
Consequently, the SEC proposed shareholder director nomination
rules in June 1991 as well as in June 1992. These proposals, however, were
63not as effective as the proposal in 2003.
VI. THE 2003 PROPOSAL: 14a-1 1
In lieu of the challenges facing the rights of shareholder proposals
in Rule 14a-8, a shareholder's only alternative is a counter-solicitation, as
56 Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 12999, 1976 WL 160347 (Nov. 22, 1976).
57 id
58 Lewis J. Sundquist II1, Note, Proposal to Allow Shareholder Nomination of
Corporate Directors: Overreaction in Times of Corporate Scandal, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1471, 1474 (2004).
59 Roberta S. Karmel, CaIPERS Versus The Business Roundtable, 9/28/06 N.Y.L.J. 5,
(col. 1) at n.13.
60 Letter from Dale E. Hanson, Executive Officer of CalPERS, to Linda C. Quinn,
Director of Corporation Finance SEC 2 (Nov. 3, 1989) (on file with THE BuSINESS
LAWYER, Univ. of Maryland School of Law).
61 Norma Sharara and Anne E. Hoke-Witherspoon, The Evolution of the 1992
Shareholder Communication Proxy Rules and Their Impact on Corporate Governance,
49 Bus. LAW. 327, 336 (1993).
62 id.
61 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 1(2003); see also Rule 14a- 11, Proposed Rule: Security Holder
Director Nominations, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm.
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governed by Rule 14a-1 1.64 On October 14, 2003, the SEC issued this
proposal, which would require companies (under certain circumstances) to
include in their proxy materials security holder nominees for election as
director. 61 Under Rule 14a-1 1, a shareholder wishing to nominate a
director, criticize an existing director, or propose changes in director
qualifications that would disqualify a member of the current board is faced
66with fewer hurdles than a shareholder seeking control of the company.
This proposed initiative, 67 most likely incited by the mistrust and skepticism
in the wake of recent corporate scandals, is intended to improve disclosure
to security holders and enhance their ability to participate meaningfully in
68the proxy process for the nomination and election of directors.
Though Rule 14a-11 was developed in response to concerns that
current procedures hamper shareholders' access to the nominating process
and frustrate shareholder influence with regard to the boards of directors of
the companies in which they invest, it does not solve all shareholder
concerns. First, nothing in the proposal's procedure establishes an inherent
right of security holders to nominate candidates for election to a company's
board of directors; rather, the procedure involves disclosure and other
6417 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-11 (2003). (A counter-solicitation occurs when a group of
shareholders propose their own slate of candidates and conduct a solicitation in which
they seek proxy authority to vote in favor of their slate rather than the slate nominated
by management.).
65 Security Holder Director Nominations, supra note 35, at 60,784.
66 See Union Elec. Co., Pub. Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 13,962, 1959
SEC LEXIS 730, *5-6 (March 26, 1959) (finding that a shareholder proposal "which
would censure all of the present members of Union's board of directors, who are also
management nominees for reelection at the 1959 meeting, and declare all of them
disqualified for re-election to office" constitutes "a solicitation in opposition to the
election of directors within the meaning of Rules 14a- 1 and 14a- 11 and therefore could
be made only by use of a proxy statement" and requires compliance with the rules
pertaining to election contests).
67 Schooly, Renner and Allen, Corporate Governance Reform: Electing Directors
Through Shareholder Proposals (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.nysscpa.org/
cpajournal/2005/1005/essentials/p62.htm.
68 Security Holder Director Nominations, supra note 35, at 60,784
("[T]he proposed rules are intended to create a mechanism for nominees of
long-term security holders, or groups of long-term security holders, with
significant holdings to be included in company proxy materials where there
are indications that security holders need such access to further an effective
proxy process. This mechanism would apply in those instances where
evidence suggests that the company has been unresponsive to security holder
concerns as they relate to the proxy process. The proposed rules would enable
security holders to engage in limited solicitations to form nominating security
holder groups and engage in solicitations in support of their nominees without
disseminating a proxy statement. The proposed rules also would establish the
filing requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for nominating
security holders.").
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requirements concerning proxy materials that are conditioned on the
existence of such a right under state law and the occurrence of specified
events. 6 9  In addition, Rule 14a-11 is financially burdensome.70
Specifically, the administrative cost burdens that would be imposed on
companies by the proposed Rule 14a-1 1 may range from $89.4 million to
$175.1 million per year.
Though Rule 14a-1 1 does not solve all Rule 14a-8(i)(8) concerns,
the SEC subsequently received a record number of comment letters based
on this proposal.72  However, in 2004, citing the complexities of
implementing proxy access, the SEC tabled the proposal indefinitely.
73
Regardless, the recent AFSCME v. AIG decision may be the tipping point
for proxy access.
VII. AFSCME v. AIG
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reopened the
possibility of shareholder proxy access in its decision in American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. American
International Group, Inc.74
A. Background
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
("AFSCME"), one of the country's largest public service employee unions,
held 26,965 shares of voting common stock of American International
Group, Inc. ("AIG"), a multi-national corporation operating in the
75insurances and financial services sector. AFSCME, acting as a
shareholder, submitted a proposal to AIG for the company's 2005 proxy
statement. This proposal, if adopted by a majority of AIG shareholders at
the Company's 2005 annual meeting,76 would have amended the AIG by-
laws to require the company, under certain circumstances, to publish the
69 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 1(2003); see also Rule 14a- 11, Proposed Rule: Security Holder
Director Nominations, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm.
70 Edward E. Potter, Comments of The Employment Policy Foundation on S7-19-03 to
Jonathan G. Katz, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/epf122203.
htm.
71 id.
72 Roel C. Campos, Speech by SEC Commissioner: The SEC's Shareholder Access
Proposal (Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch01 1005rcc
.htm.
73 David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Proxy Access: Not Then, not Now, 9/28/06
N.Y.L.J. 5, (col.1).
74 AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 121 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2006).
75 
Ld.76 See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 109(a) (2002).
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names of shareholder-nominated candidates for director positions together
with any candidates nominated by AIG's board of directors. 7
78AIG refused to place the AFSCME proposal on its proxy.
Subsequently, the SEC approved the decision, determining that the proposal
concerned shareholder elections and, thus, was not appropriate for a
shareholder proposal] 9  In addition, a lower court rejected AFSCME's
argument that the proposal was non-excludable because it concerned a
proposal to reform election procedures rather than a proposal regarding a
77 AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121,124 (2nd Cir. 2006). (citing AFSCME's
proposal (herinafter the "Proposal"):
RESOLVED, pursuant to Section 6.9 of the By-laws (the "By-laws")
of American International Group Inc. ("AIG") and section 109(a) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law, stockholders hereby amend
the By-laws to add section 6.10:
'The Corporation shall include in its proxy materials for a meeting of
stockholders the name, together with the Disclosure and Statement
(both defined below), of any person nominated for election to the
Board of Directors by a stockholder or group thereof that satisfies
the requirements of this section 6.10 (the 'Nominator'), and allow
stockholders to vote with respect to such nominee on the
Corporation's proxy card. Each Nominator may nominate one
candidate for election at a meeting).
To be eligible to make a nomination, a Nominator must:
(a) have beneficially owned 3 % or more of the Corporation's
outstanding common stock (the 'Required Shares') for at least one
year;
(b) provide written notice received by the Corporation's Secretary
within the time period specified in section 1.11 of the By-laws
containing (i) with respect to the nominee, (A) the information
required by Items 7(a), (b) and (c) of SEC Schedule 14A (such
information is referred to herein as the 'Disclosure') and (B) such
nominee's consent to being named in the proxy statement and to
serving as a director if elected; and (ii) with respect to the
Nominator, proof of ownership of the Required Shares; and
(c) execute an undertaking that it agrees to (i) assume all liability of
any violation of law or regulation arising out of the Nominator's
communications with stockholders, including the Disclosure (ii) to
the extent it uses soliciting material other than the Corporation's
proxy materials, comply with all laws and regulations relating
thereto.
The Nominator shall have the option to furnish a statement, not to
exceed 500 words, in support of the nominee's candidacy (the
'Statement'), at the time the Disclosure is submitted to the
Corporation's Secretary. The Board of Directors shall adopt a
procedure for timely resolving disputes over whether notice of a
nomination was timely given and whether the Disclosure and
Statement comply with this section 6.10 and SEC Rules.. .We urge
stockholders to vote for this proposal.
78 Id.
79 SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 372266 (Feb. 14, 2005).
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specific election.80 Thus, the issue before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was to determine whether, under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), a
shareholder proposal "relates to an election" if it seeks to amend the
corporate by-laws to establish a procedure by which the shareholder-
nominated candidates may be included on the corporate ballot.81
B. The Decision
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that
Rule 14a-8(i)(8) seeks to amend the corporate by-laws to establish a
procedure by which certain shareholders are entitled to include in the
corporate proxy materials their nominees for the board of directors. 82 The
court first noted the SEC's specific language, "relates to an election," was
not helpful in distinguishing between proposals addressing a particular seat
in a particular election and those, like AFSCME's proposal, that simply set
the background rules governing elections generally. 83 The court explained
that the language of this regulation was too ambiguous to decide on its
face . The court implied that the SEC should clarify the language when it
explained that the Rule "provides no reason to adopt one interpretation over
the other." 85
While attempting to look for guidance in the SEC's interpretation
of its own regulation, 6 the court became concerned with the SEC's amicus
brief 8 7  Specifically, the SEC argued that AFSCME's proposal is
excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) because
it would result in an immediate election contest (e.g., by
making a director nomination for a particular meeting) or
would set up a process for shareholders to conduct an
election contest in the future by requiring the company to
include shareholder director nominees in the company's
proxy materials for subsequent meetings.88
However, the court found that this interpretation greatly conflicted with the
interpretation the SEC made in 1976. 9 In that year, the SEC rejected a
proposed rule (which would have authorized the exclusion of proposals that
"relate to a corporate, political or other election to office") in favor of the
80 Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan v. American Int'l
Group, Inc., 361 F. Supp.2d 344, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
1AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2006).
82 id.
83 Id.
84 id.
85 id.
86 id.
17 AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2006).
88 Id. at 127-28.
89 Id.
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current version (which authorizes the exclusion of proposals that simply
"relate to an election") which merely avoids creating "the erroneous belief
that the Commission intended to expand the scope of the existing exclusion
to cover proposals dealing with matters previously held not excludable by
the Commission, such as cumulative voting rights, general qualifications for
directors, and political contributions by the issuer." 90 From 1976 to 1990,
the SEC applied this interpretation by excluding shareholder proposals only
if they related to an immediate election contest which would be governed
by other proxy rules. 91
In 1990, the SEC inexplicably signaled a change of course by
deeming excludable proposals that "might result in contested elections,
even if the proposal purports to alter general procedures for nominating and
electing directors. 92  Because the SEC had never discussed its shift in
policy, the court found it more appropriate to defer to the 1976
interpretation rather than the SEC's interpretation post- 1990.93 Therefore,
based on the 1976 interpretation, the court agreed with the SEC that a
shareholder proposal seeking to contest management's nominees would be
excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(8). 94 However, a proposal seeking to add a
proxy access amendment to the corporate by-laws, like in this case, does
not involve opposing solicitations dealing with "the election or removal of
directors" and should be allowed. 95
In response to the defendant's brief,96 the court recognized that its
holding promotes a less restrictive process than that created by proposed
Rule 14 a-1 1. 97 In other words, there may be no reason for a rule like l4 a-
I1 to coexist with the procedure that the holding makes available to
shareholders. 98 If the Commission ultimately decides to adopt Rule 14a-11,
90 Id. (citing Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-129999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Nov. 22,
1976)[hereinafter the "1976 Adoption"].
91 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Calif., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30873, at *4-5
(Feb. 24, 1983); Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 26205, at *22 (Mar. 3,
1981); Union Oil Co. of Calif., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 24701, at *7 (Jan. 29,
1981); Unicare Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 15475, at *7 (May 13, 1980);
see also Newbury Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67178, at *3 (Aug. 11, 1986)
(emphasis added).
92 AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 127 (citing Thermo Electron, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1990 WL 286329, at * 19 (Mar. 22, 1990); Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
1990 WL 285946, at *7 (Feb. 6, 1990); Bank of Boston, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990
WL 285947, at * 14 (Jan. 26, 1990)) (emphasis added).
9' AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 129.
94 id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 124-25.
97 AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 127-28 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2006).
98 ,,
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then such an action, although unnecessary, would likely be sufficient to
modify the interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) that the court adopted. 99
Essentially, the court decided that an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation made at the time the regulation was implemented
should control unless the agency has offered sufficient reasons for its
changed interpretation. 100  It explained that although the SEC has
substantial discretion to adopt new interpretations of its own regulations, it
nevertheless has a "duty to explain its departure from prior norms." 10 1 The
court arrived at this decision because a governmental agency's own
conflicting interpretations do not receive the usual deference a court would
reserve for its own interpretations.1 2 Given the court's ultimate decision to
interpret Rule 14a-8(i)(8) as applying to shareholder proposals that relate to
a particular election and not procedural rules governing elections
generally,103 the SEC had to respond.
VIII. SEC RESPONSE
The ruling in AFSCME v. AIG did not strike down the SEC's
position (the SEC was not a party to the suit). Instead, it gave the agency
the opportunity to clarify its position: to either restate its former policy or
adopt a new one. 
°4
Two days after this decision, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
directed the Division of Corporation Finance to draft a rule to standardize
nationwide application of 14a-8(i)(8), the "town meeting rule."'1 5
Specifically, the SEC intended to present its proposal at an October 18,
2006 open meeting, leaving time for public commentary before a final
proposal and rulemaking for the 2007 proxy season. ° 6 After no action was
taken at the meeting on October 18, plans for discussion were rescheduled
99 Id.
100 AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 131.
101 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973)
(citing Sec. ofAgric. v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1954)); cf Torrington
Extend-A-Care Employee Ass'n v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 580, 589 (2d Cir.1994) (stating that
"an agency may alter its interpretation of a statute so long as the new rule is consistent
with the statute, applies to all litigants, and is supported by a 'reasoned analysis' ").
102 See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994) (quoting INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n. 30 (1987)) (stating that an agency's
interpretation of a regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is " 'entitled to
considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view")).
103 AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 130 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2006) (emphasis added).04 Id. at 129.
105 Bill Baue, Court Affirms Share owner Right to File Resolutions on Proxy Access for
Nominating Directors (Sept. 14, 2006), available at http://www.socialfunds.com/news
/article.cgi/2109.html.
106 id.
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for December 13, 2006.107 Unfortunately, discussion of the AIG case was
dropped from the agenda of this December 13 Commission meeting, 08 and
put off "until at least January 2007."'109 Subsequently, the SEC has received
"shareholder access" by-law proposals.' 10
A. Proposals after AFSCME v. AIG
Though proxy access proposals have incited some controversy after
their submissions to companies such as Reliant Energy and UnitedHealth
Group,''' the most telling reaction by the SEC is with regards to the
Hewlett-Packard Co. 112 In a November 3, 2006 letter to the staff of the
SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, lawyers for Hewlett-Packard asked
for permission to exclude an access proposal.' 13  In that letter,
representatives of Hewlett-Packard' 14 argued that the AIG decision of the
Second Circuit (based in New York) is not binding on the computer
company because it is based in California and plans to hold its annual
meeting there, which is outside the court's jurisdiction.'"'
On January 22, 2007, the SEC declined to weigh in on whether
Hewlett-Packard may block a proposal to give shareholders more say in
selecting corporate directors by the use of corporate proxy ballots.' 6 The
SEC's abstention from the Hewlett-Packard proposals implies that they had
no response to the decision in AFSCME v. AIG and still raises questions
107 SEC Press Release, Commission Announces Schedule for Action Regarding Section
404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Foreign Private Issuer Deregistration, Internet
Availability of Proxy Materials, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 14A-8 (Oct. 11,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-172.htm.
108 Ronald H. Janis, Mandating Democracy In Corporate Governance: The Right
Move? (January 2007), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?
artType-view&artMonth-January&artYear-2007&EntryNo-6131.
109 Peter J. Wallison, A Costly Delay Keeps Firms in the Dark (Dec. 15, 2006),
available at http://www.american.com/archive/2006/december/a-costly-delay-keeps-
firms-in-the-dark/.
110 Id.
111 Judith Burns, Reliant Energy shareholder withdraws proxy-access proposal (Feb.
21, 2007), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/reliant-energy-
shareholder-withdraws-proxy-access/story.aspx?guid-17B45 lB14D9-1D38-4256-
ADF6-2F5EAOB81FDF%7D.
112 id.
113 Kara Scannell, Activist Holders Gain Ground In Quest for Access to Ballots, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 23, 2007, at C3.
114 Tad Kopinski, SEC Delays Proxy Access Again, Institutional Shareholder Services
(Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://blog.issproxy.com/2006/12/sec delays proxy access
_agains.html (The proposal was filed by AFSCME and state pension funds from
Connecticut, New York, and North Carolina.).
115 Id.
116 Judith Burns, 3rd UPDATE: SEC Staff Takes No Position On H-P Proxy Vote, Dow
Jones Newswires (Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://news.morningstar.com/news/
ViewNews.asp?article/DJ/200701221610DOWJONESDJONLINE000529 univ.xml.
2007]
588 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA W [Vol. 2:1
JOURNAL
about whether companies may continue to exclude certain types of
shareholder proposals from proxy ballots.'"
B. What Happens to Rule 14a-8(i) (8) now?
The failure of the SEC to act is difficult to understand. It raises
inevitable difficulties for companies that will now be receiving proposals
from shareholders, demanding the same treatment AIG has been compelled
to offer AFSCME."' Essentially, the abstention taken (at least for
companies in the Second Circuit) means those companies must include such
an amendment in their proxy material.' 9 Companies outside the court's
immediate jurisdiction, however, are likely to feel that they should also
follow the court precedent. 12  Failure to do so might leave them open to
litigation. 1
2
'
Though the SEC is not bound by the court's decision, 122 SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox said the SEC is working on a "clear rule" that
would apply to all companies in 2008.123
1. Potential SEC action
If a decision by the SEC stands "as is," it would make it
significantly easier for shareholders to add their own nominees to ballots.
1 24
Specifically,
shareholders could submit proposals under Rule 14a-8 that
would allow them to make nominations to the board in
future years (if the proposals were approved by
shareholders and if the nominating shareholders were
eligible to nominate candidates under the criteria set forth
in the by-law amendment).1 25
However, if the SEC does amend Rule 14a-8(i)(8), it can take one of two
actions: amend it to the liking of the Second Circuit or amend it to
strengthen the language of the 1947 proposal.
117 Kevin Drawbaugh, SEC Stays On Fence Over iP Shareholder Proposal, Reuters
(Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.crn.com.au/story.aspx?CIID-71768&r-rstory.
118Id.
119 Wallison, supra note 109.
120 id.
121 Id.
122 id.
123 Judith Burns, 3rd UPDATE: SEC Staff Takes No Position On H-P Proxy Vote, Dow
Jones Newswires, (Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://news.morningstar.com/news/
ViewNews.asp?article-/DJ/20070122161 ODOWJONESDJONLINE000529 univ.xml.
124 Broc Romanek, The SEC's Response, Amend Rule 14a-8, (Sept. 8, 2006), available
at http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/archive/001221 .html.
125 id.
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2. Amending the Rule to the liking of the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's ultimate decision was to interpret Rule 14a-
8(i)(8) as applying to shareholder proposals that relate to a particular
election and not procedural rules governing elections generally.
26
Proponents of the AIG decision believe that one of the basic assumptions of
corporate governance is that shareholders should have the right to exercise a
meaningful role in the election of directors to ensure board
accountability. 27 Consequently, the strengthening of shareholder rights
could lead to positive economic effects in the U.S. market. 128
Moreover, proponents believe that the lack of these rights and the
inability for shareholders to have a meaningful say in electing directors has
contributed to the costly and inefficient adversarial relationships that often
develop between shareholders and companies in the U.S. 12 9 Strengthening
shareholders' rights with respect to director selection would encourage
more dialogue, negotiation, and constructive engagement, and would help
reduce the confrontational nature of shareholder activism in the United
States. 13 Based on our global perspective, the U.S. system clearly lags
behind other major markets where the rights of shareholders to participate
in and influence director elections are already well established.131 Giving
shareholders a stronger voice in the nomination and election process would
allow the U.S. market to use pre-existing successful international practices
and election standards. 132 In turn, by opening up the process to permit
shareholder access proposals, U.S. corporate governance standards will be
further improved.
Critics of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit have expressed concern that shareholders would abuse procedures
that might develop pursuant to resolutions establishing the right to access.1
33
However, institutional investors, as fiduciaries, "are obligated to behave
rationally and in the economic interest of their beneficiaries." '134 In other
126 AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2006) (emphasis added).
127 Letter from John Wilcox, Chair of Committee on Cross-Border Voting Practices to
Christopher Cox, Chairman of SEC, "Re: SEC Review of Rule 14a-8(i)(8),"
International Corporate Governance Network, (Oct. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.icgn.org/organisation/documents/cbv/cox letter oct2006.pdf.
128 id.
129 id.
130 Id.
131 Id
132 Id.
133 Letter from John Wilcox, Chair of Committee on Cross-Border Voting Practices to
Christopher Cox, Chairman of SEC, "Re: SEC Review of Rule 14a-8(i)(8)",
International Corporate Governance Network, (Oct. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.icgn.org/organisation/documents/cbv/cox-letter-oct2006.pdf.
134 id.
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words, proponents believe that it "makes no sense for shareholders to
undermine the enterprises in which they have invested.'
35
3. Amending the Rule to strengthen the language of the 1947
proposal
On the other side of the spectrum, others feel that current existing
rules do not necessarily preclude shareholder activism. 136  Specifically,
dissident shareholders have the right to mount proxy fights to challenge
company-nominated slates of directors. 137 Moreover, the listing standards
for both the Nasdaq and NYSE require that boards be composed of a
majority of independent directors, who themselves comprise the search
committees for new directors.
138
If the SEC did adopt changes granting more access to shareholders,
some feel that this alteration would surrender corporate governance to anti-
corporate interests.1 39 Proponents of this idea, typically siding with the
corporation, argue that "the original SEC position made a great deal of
sense, since it required those who wanted to challenge a company's board
nominees to prepare and distribute their own proxy material. 1 41 "This
process would provide shareholders with the necessary information to make
a decision."'
14 1
A contention from critics of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decision is that shareholders lack accountability.1 42 Specifically, "a
shareholder who is elected as a representative will disrupt the delicate
internal dynamics that make boards successful.' 143  "Its effect will be
analogous to that of cumulative voting," which opens the possibility for
minority shareholders to have representatives on the board.1 44 "Experience
with cumulative voting suggests that it often leads to pre-meeting caucuses
by the majority and a reduction in information flows to the board as a
whole. 45... In turn, this results in adversarial relations between the majority
and minority board members, which can interfere with effective board
governance." 1
4 6
1,5 Id.
136 Kerpen, supra note 1.
1,37 Id.
138 id.
139 Id.
140 Wallison, supra note 109.
141 Id.
142 Peter Clapman, Letter to the Editor 'Corporate Democracy' Ultimately Means
Improved Shareholder Value, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007, at B4.
141 Stephen Bainbridge, Does the SEC Know When Enough is Enough? (Jan. 8, 2004),
available at http://www.techcentralstation.com/010804B.html.
144 id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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In addition, as elaborated by the D.C. Circuit's seminal decision in
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 147 the federal proxy rules were not intended to
deal with the substantive aspects of shareholder voting rights. 148  The
federal proxy rules are properly concerned only with the need for full
disclosure and fair solicitation procedures. It is state corporation law that
decides the rules of the game by which directors are elected.1 49 Thus, the
exclusion of matters relating to election of directors created by Rule 14a-
8(i)(8) needs to be interpreted expansively.
XI. CONCLUSION
For years, the SEC has allowed companies to reject requests by
shareholders to have their own slate of directors included on a company's
official election materials.150 Shareholder access on most rights was a dead
issue until September 2006, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled in favor of shareholders in AFSCME v. AIG.15 1 Since then,
shareholders have been taking advantage: Reliant Energy, UnitedHealth
Group and Hewlett-Packard Co. are examples. On January 23, 2007, the
AFSCME and the Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds sued the
Hewlett-Packard Co. in U.S. District Court in Connecticut. 152 "The lawsuit
asks the court to force Hewlett-Packard to include in this year's proxy a
proposed change to company by-laws that would make it easier for
shareholder groups to run their own candidates for board elections. '
Shareholder groups intend to make Hewlett-Packard a proxy access test
case.
154
Though some believe that the Hewlett-Packard case has not come
soon enough, others think it is too soon to argue the case for or against
shareholder access.1 55 Specifically, skeptics point out that we do not know
what forms of access shareholders might propose, nor do we know the
limitations or "qualifications that might be included in resolutions designed
to attract widespread shareholder support needed for approval.1 5 6
147 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
148 Stephen Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH.
U. L.Q. 565, 611 (1991).
149 id.
150 Editorial, Board Games, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2006, at A 12.
151 See AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2006).
152 Lorraine Woellert, HP Fight Forecasts Stormy Proxy Season, Businessweek.com.
(Jan. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2007/tc20070 124559157.htm?c
han top+news top+news+index businessweek+exclusives.
153 Id.
154 id.
155 Letter from John Wilcox, supra note 127, at 2.
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We do know, however, that where these rights already exist in
jurisdictions outside the U.S., there have been none of the abuses which
opponents of shareholder access fear.' 5  Evidence indicates that though
shareholders' bargaining powers are increased, these rights actually create a
form of activism fostering collaborative dialogue and negotiation rather
than confrontation and adversarial proceedings.' 58
Regardless, "long gone are the days when a director could get away
with a quick rubber-stamp of a CEO's plans."1 59 Now, shareholders have
become more interested in playing a stronger role in corporate governance
decisions. Thus, the SEC should conclude that some form of shareholder
access is inevitable, and that it must adopt rules to provide some
certainty. 160
157 Id.
158 id.
159 Christoph Neimann, News & Insights, Bus. WIK., Jan. 22, 2007, at 37-39.
160 Kerpen, supra note 1.
